

# History



## HIGHER AND STANDARD LEVEL

### PAPER 1

Friday 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2016

1 hour

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#### INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
  - Answer all questions from ONE section.
  - The maximum mark for this examination paper is [24 marks].
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*Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.*

*Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ... ; minor changes are not indicated.*

## Section C: Move to Global War

### Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931-1941): Events

#### Source A

***“The Army’s hopes regarding current foreign policies”. Recommendation by the Japanese army to the Japanese Government on 3<sup>rd</sup> July, 1938.***

- 1) By strengthening the anti-Comintern axis and disposing of the China Incident decisively, to win de facto recognition by the Powers of our China Policy and persuade them to cooperate in the construction of a new China in accord with our wishes; to win their support for our posture; and by so doing to bring about a resolution of the Incident quickly and smoothly and also contribute to the success of the empire's foreign policy after the Incident has been settled.
- 2) To co-ordinate all diplomatic and economic activities on the principle of 'national policies first'.

#### Source B

***From Eri Hotta, ‘Japan 1941’, Vintage Books, 2014, p. 31***

The truce had become a dead letter by July 20<sup>th</sup> with Chiang (Jiang) taking his time to give it his official approval. As the war spread and intensified, Japan bombed Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou and other major cities – Konoé blamed it on others, especially, the army’s bellicose [warlike] elements who were conveniently nameless and faceless.


#### Source C

***From Peter Duus, ‘The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 6: The Twentieth Century, Cambridge UP, 1995, p. 305***

It was a reflection of the split in army circles that decisions to mobilise were made and cancelled four times before a decision was made to send three divisions to northern China on July 27<sup>th</sup>. Neither Prime Minister Konoé nor Foreign Minister Hirota had clear views about what to do. In the final analysis, they simply followed the lead of the expansionist faction within the Japanese army.

Source D

Cartoon: "The sleeping giant begins to feel it". Published in The Philadelphia Inquirer, Hugh Hutton, United States, 1937



## Questions

1. a) According to Source A, what foreign policy objectives does the Japanese army have? [3 marks]
  
1. b) What message is conveyed by Source D? [2 marks]
  
2. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source A for historians studying influences on Japanese foreign policy. [4 marks]
  
3. Compare and contrast what Sources B and C reveal about how decisions were made to mobilise Japanese troops for China. [6 marks]
  
4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, carefully explain why Japan attacked China in July 1937 . [9 marks]